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Implied Terms: the Foundation in Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
 
Hugh Collins* 
 
 
 
Confusion as much as controversy permeates the subject of implied terms in contracts.  
Controversy always surrounds their purpose and legitimacy, for implied terms lie on the 
point of friction between the basic disposition of the common law to respect freedom of 
contract and the regulatory impulse to prevent the worst instances of market exploitation 
and opportunism.  Implied terms permit judicial intervention whilst maintaining the 
appearance of conformity to the idea of respecting the parties’ self-determination. 
Confusion now reigns as well, however, for there is no consensus on the legal tests for 
the introduction of implied terms into contracts, even to the extent of losing them 
altogether within the nebula of the interpretation of contracts.   Historical guidance is 
scant: the influential scholars of contract law in the nineteenth century such as Anson, 
Pollock, and Leake, did not acknowledge the existence of implied terms as they are 
understood in modern contract law.1  It was not till the middle of the twentieth century 
that the topic of implied terms was addressed explicitly at any length in the books.2  
Today, the treatises recite numerous tests for the implication of terms such as the 
presumed intention of the parties, business efficacy, the officious bystander, business 
necessity, reasonableness, custom, and the construction of the contract as a whole, but 
seem unable to choose between these approaches in so far as they may differ, or indeed to 
present an internally consistent view of how many tests are available. Despite this lack of 
coherent guidance from the learned authors, even in the most deferential texts, judges are 
sometimes chastised for getting the law or the results of cases wrong.  In the hope of 
dispelling confusion, though at the risk of provoking controversy, an interpretation of the 
law will be presented that explains how implied terms represent the principal technique 
by which English courts ensure performance of contracts in good faith. 
 
                                                 
Vinerian Professor of English Law, All Souls College, Oxford.  I am grateful to many colleagues and 
judges for comments on earlier versions of this paper, especially Michael Bridge and Mindy Chen-Wishart. 
 
1
 Initial and subsequent impossibility of performance (today often regarded as mistake and frustration 
respectively) were regarded as ‘implied conditions’ of the existence/enforceability of the contract, as in 
Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S 826, e.g. M Leake, Principles of the Law of Contracts (R R A Walker 
(ed) 8th edn, Stevens 1931).  These and other conditions, particularly in the law of sales, (breach of which 
entitled the injured party to escape liability) were increasingly ascribed to the intentions of the parties rather 
than the application of rules of law: D J Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations 
(OUP 1999) 225. 
2
 The first seminal and thoughtful modern discussion of implied terms in English law (which distinguishes 
two kinds of implied terms) was probably Sir John Salmond and P H Winfield, Principles of the Law of 
Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell 1927) 45-55.  R Sutton and N P Shannon, On Contracts (Butterworths 1933) 
included under the heading ‘discharge of contracts’ a reference to implied terms based on the ‘intention of 
the parties’.   After 1945, textbooks included modern accounts of implied terms as contrasted with express 
terms: G C Cheshire and C H S Fifoot, The Law of Contracts (Butterworths 1945) 102-3; followed by A 
Guest (ed), Anson’s Law of Contract ( 21st edn OUP  1959) p.117; G H  Treitel, The Law of Contract 
(Stevens 1962) 120. 
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1. The Bull in the China Shop 
 
An authoritative restatement of the law of contract in the Western legal tradition, entitled 
The Principles of European Contract Law (commonly called PECL), advances the 
following synthesis of the law of implied terms. 
In addition to the express terms a contract may contain implied terms which stem 
from 
(a) the intention of the parties, 
(b) the nature and purpose of the contract, and 
(c) good faith and fair dealing.3 
Another recent restatement of European contract law, the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference, essentially repeats the second and third headings, but substitutes the idea of 
‘tacit agreement’ for the intention of the parties.4    
Although the idea of an implied term originates from the common law, for 
English lawyers these formulations of when terms may be implied into a contract use 
some unfamiliar and somewhat uncomfortable concepts.  The unguarded reference to the 
intention of the parties appears dangerously subjective in orientation, looking at what the 
parties actually wanted or would probably have agreed, rather than using the objective 
approach to the interpretation of contracts normally favoured in English law.5   The 
second ground for implication of terms based on the ‘nature and purpose of the contract’ 
is reminiscent in its reference to the ‘nature’ of the contract of the now discredited late 
scholastic Aristotelian philosophy;6 and the reference to the purpose of the contract is 
surely influenced by the German professors’ metaphysical use of the purpose or ‘Zweck’ 
of the contract to guide its interpretation and application.7  Finally, the reference to good 
faith and fair dealing, we have been told by eminent legal authorities, is contrary to the 
ethos of the common law of contracts,8  unworkably vague, and destructive of 
                                                 
3
 O Lando and H Beale (eds), Principles of European Contract Law Part I and II (Kluwer Law International 
2000) 302-5, Article 6:102 Implied Terms.  It should be noted as well that PRCL proposes a mandatory 
duty of good faith and fair dealing (art. 1:201), a default duty to ‘co-operate in order to give full effect to 
the contract,’ (Art 1:202) and the binding quality of ‘reasonable generally applicable usages’ (Art 1:105).   
4
 C Von Bar and E Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (OUP  2010) Article II.-9:101, Vol. 1 575. 
5
 Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597; Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building 
Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL).  PECL explains, however, that the formulation should not be taken 
literally: ‘The first indicator refers to the presumed intention of the parties; the court should consider what 
parties, acting in accordance with good faith and fair dealing, would reasonably have agreed if they had 
discussed the question.’ O Lando and H Beale (eds),  Principles of European Contract Law Part I and II 
(Kluwer Law International 2000) 303. 
6
 J  Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (Clarendon Press OUP 1991) 208-
213.  PECL probably derives the phrase from the French Civil Code art 1135: ‘the obligations under a 
contract extend not only to what is expressly stipulated, but also to everything which by law, equity or 
custom must follow from the nature of the particular contract.’ 
7
 In a typical example in German law of ‘constructive interpretation’ it is said that the duty of a judge is to 
‘discover and take into account what, in the light of the whole purpose of the contract, they [the parties] 
would have said if they had regulated the point in question, acting pursuant to the requirements of good 
faith and sound business practice.’ See BGH 18 December 1954, BGHZ 16, 71, 76.   See DCFR above n 4 
Vol 1 581. 
8
 Eg Lord Ackner in Walford v Miles, ‘the duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently 
 3 
commercial certainty.9   To quote Professor Michael Bridge: ‘The introduction of a 
general principle of good faith and fair dealing would be like letting a bull loose in a 
china shop.’10  
Even so, this list of sources of implied terms in PECL at least rings a bell for an 
English lawyer.  As Professor Andrew Burrows acknowledges in a comment on this 
provision in PECL in his casebook: 
‘The first two of these correspond to the implication of terms by the English 
courts although the tests in English law mean that terms are not readily implied.  
In English law, there is no overt reference to good faith and dealing (sic) as a 
source of implied terms.’11 
Presumably he has in mind the classification used in most (though not all)12 textbooks 
today of the two categories of terms ‘implied in fact’ and terms ‘implied by law’; these 
categories display some similarities with the first and second sources of implied terms 
listed in PECL.  His final remark regarding the lack of overt reference to good faith and 
fair dealing may need revision in the light of the recent decision of the High Court in Yam 
Seng v International Trade Corporation.13  In that case, Leggatt J asserted that ‘there is 
nothing novel or foreign to English law in recognising an implied duty of good faith in 
the performance of contracts.’14  In order to emphasise the objectivity of this particular 
standard of good faith, he added that the term could advantageously be described as a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of contracts.15  In particular, 
Leggatt J suggested that some enhanced duties of disclosure and co-operation might 
apply in ‘relational’ contracts.16  In making those adventurous remarks, has Leggatt J. 
brought English law into broad conformity with the restatement of the law of implied 
terms in PECL, thereby unleashing the bull in the china shop? 
The thesis advanced here is that the judicial practice of implying terms into 
contracts in English law has never been properly understood and is poorly represented by 
the tripartite division of sources of implied terms in PECL.  The true ground for implying 
terms into contracts is always good faith and fair dealing, though the distinction between 
terms implied in fact and terms implied in law signifies different meanings of the 
kaleidoscopic idea of good faith.  In short, implied terms have always been the bull in the 
china shop, but the predicted destruction has not happened, thanks indubitably to the 
skills of the matadors, the common law judges.  My thesis advances in a number of 
propositions, which it may be convenient to list in advance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations”. [1992] 2 AC 128, 138. 
9
 M  Bridge, ‘Doubting Good Faith’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business Quarterly 430, 450: ‘There is no 
general duty of good faith and fair dealing in English contract law and there is no reason why there should 
be.’ 
10
 M  Bridge, ‘Doubting Good Faith’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business Quarterly 430, 448.  The metaphor 
of the china shop may be been introduced by Powell: ‘When I read of a lawyer trying to tread daintily in 
the china-shops of ethics, I wish that someone would lead him back to the streets where walk all manner of 
men.’ R  Powell, ‘Good Faith in Contracts’ (1956) 9 CLP 16, 38. 
11
 A  Burrows, A Casebook on Contract (4th edn, Hart Publishing 2013) 227 emphasis in the original.  
12
 Eg H  Beale (General Ed), Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) Vol I 13-003 (p.986). 
13
 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111.   
14
 Ibid, [145]. 
15
 Ibid [150]. 
16
 Ibid [142]. 
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1.  There are two types of implied terms, not three as in PECL, and certainly not only 
one. 
2. There are political and structural reasons that provoke confusion surrounding the 
categorisation of implied terms.  
3.  Neither sort of implied term has much in common with interpretation of contracts.   
4. Ideas of good faith and fair dealing should be acknowledged as central to the 
implication of terms, though different notions of good faith apply to terms implied in fact 
and terms implied by law.   
5. Although the category of ‘relational contracts’ is both imprecise and unsuitable for the 
task, it is possible to identify a group of contracts (to be called networks) that shares 
crucial relevant features in common - an intensified economic logic of both competition 
and co-operation that arises from their structure as a quasi-integrated production regime – 
and that requires intensified duties of loyalty and co-operation implied by law.  
 
 
2. Two Sources of Implied Terms 
 
There are two sources of implied terms in English law, not three and not one.  This claim 
depends both upon an interpretation of the authorities and a logical claim.   When asked 
to imply a term into a contract, a court is always being asked to do one of two things.   
The first request is to devise a default rule that applies to a standard kind of 
transaction whenever it is used.  Although this request is made in respect of a particular 
contractual dispute, the court will appreciate that its ruling will generate a precedent for 
all subsequent cases involving the same type of transaction where the proposed rule will 
be applied in the absence of some express term that contradicts the default rule.  The rule 
might be that goods sold should be warranted to be of merchantable quality,17 or that a 
service should be performed with reasonable care.18  In responding to that request, a court 
is providing in an incremental way, with some trial and error arising from subsequent 
litigation, the default rules or standard ‘incidents impliedly annexed to particular forms of 
contracts.’19  In codified systems of law, these standard incidents are specified in articles 
of the civil code, but under the common law, even in legislation, they are attributed 
artificially to the agreement of the parties as an implied term rather than a rule of law.20  
These are the terms usually described as terms ‘implied by law’.21 
                                                 
17
 Gardiner v Gray (1815) 4 Campbell 144, 171 E.R. 46; Jones v Just (1868) LR 3 QB 197. 
18
 Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909, 92 ER 107. 
19
 Equitable Life Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Hyman [2000] UKHL 39, [2002] 1 AC 408, Lord 
Steyn 458-9 (HL).   
20
 Lord Denning MR may have been a lone voice objecting explicitly to this artificial terminology: Shell 
UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1976]1 WLR 1187, at p. 1196G: ‘the obligation is a legal incident of the 
relationship which is attached by the law itself and not by reason of any implied term.’; but Lord Wright 
was also a ‘Realist’ in this respect: Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd Cooper [1941] AC 108, at p. 137, ‘The 
expression “implied term” is used in different senses. Sometimes it denotes some term which does not 
depend on the actual intention of the parties but on a rule of law, such as the terms, warranties or conditions 
which, if not expressly excluded, the law imports, as for instance under the Sale of Goods Act and the 
Marine Insurance Act’. 
21
 Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555, 579: ‘the implied term is imposed by law, 
not in respect of a particular contract but as a legal incident of this kind of contract’, Viscount Simmonds 
579; ‘Some contractual terms may be implied by general rules of law. These general rules, some of which 
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The second request is to devise a rule for a particular contract that alters its 
allocation of risks on the ground that one party is seeking to take advantage of an 
omission in the express allocation of risks to obtain an advantage that has not been 
bargained for.  Such a request tries to tempt a court, with the benefit of hindsight, to 
rewrite a contract by providing for an allocation of risk that had not been mentioned in 
the express terms, for the purpose of ensuring (what it is hoped to persuade the court 
would be) a fairer result.  The principal rhetorical strategy when making such a request is 
to present the proposed implied term as having always been, at least from an objective 
point of view, an unexpressed ingredient of the intentions of the parties.  These are terms 
usually described as terms ‘implied in fact’. 
These two types of implied terms are logically distinct, though not always easy to 
separate in practice.  The difference between them lies in the regulatory aim of the 
judicial intervention.  For terms implied by law, the aim is to provide a default rule for a 
particular kind of contract that will serve to regulate this market transaction for the future.  
For terms implied in fact, the objective is a precise surgical operation to revise the 
allocation of risk in the context of a particular transaction.  It is possible that a succession 
of cases concerning a particular kind of contract involving disputes over a similar issue 
will gradually create a body of precedents that may be adopted as a general default rule.  
But the transition from a term implied in fact to a term implied by law requires a 
significant reorientation in legal reasoning.  Until there is judicial recognition that the 
term has become a standard incident for that type of contract, the precedents provide an 
unreliable source of a general default rule. 
Custom is often held up as a third category of implied term.22  But on closer 
inspection, all such cases fall into different categories.  Most often custom is used as a 
point of reference for understanding the meaning of the contract; it is part of the context 
that a reasonable person uses to interpret the meaning of a promise.  That is why a 
customary rule has to be both reasonable and notorious to be incorporated into a 
contract.23  In the county of Suffolk, in 1832, local custom proved that a promise to sell 
1000 rabbits really meant one hundred dozen or 1200 rabbits.24   In other cases, custom is 
used to explain the incorporation of documents into a contract without the need for an 
explicit agreement between the parties.25  The remaining cases that have regard to 
customary practices would now be classified as terms implied by law as a standard 
incident of this type of contract.   In the nineteenth century, customs were sometimes 
                                                                                                                                                 
are now statutory, for example, Sale of Goods Act, Bills of Exchange Act, etc., derive in the main from the 
common law by which they have become attached in the course of time to certain classes of contractual 
relationships, for example, landlord and tenant, innkeeper and guest, contracts of guarantee and contracts of 
personal service.’ Lord Tucker, 594.   
22
 E.g. Neil Andrews, Contract Law (Cambridge U P 2011) 373; M Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (4th edn, 
OUP  2012) 378; E  Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract (13th edn Sweet & Maxwell  2011) 222; E 
McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn  OUP  2012) 343. 
23
 Cunliffe-Owen v Teather & Greenwood [1967] 1 WLR 1421, 1438-9. 
24
 Smith v Wilson (1832) 8 B & Ad 728, 110 ER 266.  Pollock suggest that this custom was based on ‘long 
hundreds’ of six score used in the ‘Anglicus Numerous’ of Anglo Norman surveys: F Pollock, Principles of 
Contract (10th edn, Stevens 1936) 248, though possibly the customs of Suffolk are idiosyncratic. 
25
 British Crane Hire Corporation Ltd v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd [1975] QB 303 (CA); Henry v London 
General Transport Services Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 488, [2002] ICR 910. 
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described as implied terms to avoid the parole evidence rule,26 but this device is 
unnecessary under the modern English approach to the interpretation of contracts.27   
The alternative view - that there is only one type of implied term – probably 
originates from a turning point in the development of the law in the late nineteenth 
century.   English law confronted the difficulty of trying to reconcile the settled practice 
of the judges imposing standard incidents or default rules on contracts with the ideals of 
freedom of contract and the fashionable view at that time that the source of all contractual 
obligations had to be discovered in the agreement or will of the parties.28  This problem 
of coherence in legal doctrine came to a head in 1889 in the famous case, The 
Moorcock.29    The issue in the case was whether the owner of a jetty, who had permitted 
the plaintiff to moor his steamship there temporarily for the purpose of unloading in due 
course at the owner’s nearby wharf, was under any liability for damage to the vessel.  
There was a cock up with the mooring of the Moorcock, because the ship’s hull was 
damaged by an unexpected bar of rock or gravel in the Thames’ muddy river bed as it 
settled at low tide.  In modern terminology, the issue was whether the owner of the wharf 
would be liable in negligence in the provision of a service by failing either to inspect the 
bottom of the river or to warn the owner of the vessel of the potential danger.  The 
informal contract was silent on the matter, so the claimant suggested liability should arise 
under an implied term.  Previous cases had held that, as a standardised term, the owner of 
a mooring owed a duty of care to those it invited to use the mooring.  This case was 
slightly different, because the berth was the river bed, not owned by the defendant and 
some distance from the wharf, reached by a jetty.  Bowen LJ concluded his judgment by 
holding that this case, with a suitably modified implied term to take account of the point 
that the defendants had no power to make the berth safe, fell within the previous line of 
authorities.  But an earlier passage of his judgment is one for which the case is always 
remembered.  Bowen LJ said, 
‘In business transactions such as this, what the law desires to effect by the 
implication is to give such business efficacy to the transaction as must have been 
intended at all events by both parties who are business men; not to impose on one 
side all the perils of the transaction, or to emancipate one side from all the 
chances of failure, but to make each party promise in law as much, at all events, 
as it must have been in the contemplation of both parties that he should be 
responsible for in respect of those perils or chances.’30 
Why were these obiter and perhaps ex tempore remarks significant?  Initially, 
nothing happened.  More than forty years on, in 1930, the editors of Chitty on contracts 
for the first time acknowledged almost in passing that there were such things as implied 
                                                 
26
 Hutton v Warren (1836) 1 M & W 466, 150 ER 517. Parke B, 150 ER 521:  ‘It has long been settled that, 
in commercial transactions, extrinsic evidence of custom and usage is admissible to annex incidents to 
written contracts, in matters with respect to which they are silent.’ 
27
 Law Commission, Law of Contract: The Parol Evidence Rule, (Law Com No 154, 1986) Cmnd. 9700 . 
28
 P S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press OUP 1979); D  Kennedy, The 
Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought (Beard Books  2006) Chapter 4 (though neither of these works 
examine the particular instance of implied terms). 
29
 The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64, CA. 
30
 Ibid 68. 
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terms and that the test in The Moorcock was frequently invoked in the courts.31  The 
formula for inserting implied terms on the grounds of business efficacy proved attractive 
to authors of contract law textbooks for two reasons.  First, the test sought to reconcile 
the practice of imposing default rules with the fashionable ‘will theory’ of contract.  
Bowen LJ’s argument was that the parties must be presumed to have intended this term, 
not because they had actually thought about it, but because it must have been in their 
contemplation as a necessary ingredient of the contract in view of their commercial aims.  
This point provided a formula based upon a presumption of intention or will that 
purported to reconcile the practice of imposing standardised terms with the need to 
attribute those terms to the will of the parties.  Second, even better from a libertarian 
perspective, Bowen LJ insisted that such terms should not be inserted into contracts to 
make them fairer or more reasonable, but only when the term was strictly necessary to 
give business efficacy to the transaction.  This formula limited any potential infringement 
with the parties’ freedom of contract to instances where apparently they must have 
implicitly agreed to the condition.  In short, this conception of an implied term was 
invented to reconcile the practice of judicial imposition of standardised obligations on 
market participants with liberal theories of the sources of contractual obligations. 
In the Moorcock case itself, however, it was far from clear that the business 
efficacy test was satisfied.  On the contrary, all members of the Court of Appeal seem to 
have been heavily influenced by the point that the owner of the wharf was in a better 
position to inspect the hidden reef, or, to put the point in modern language, the defendant 
was in the best position to avoid the accident at the least cost.  In short, these implied 
provisions on liability were efficient and therefore applied as standard incidents of the 
contract.  The leading case on terms implied in fact, The Moorcock, was in actuality 
merely a routine instance of the imposition of terms implied by law by reference to 
precedents, but out of deference to the prevailing will theory of contract, was presented in 
addition as justified by reference to the presumed intentions of the parties.  It created the 
impression, therefore, that there was only one type of implied term, a term that was 
attributed to the presumed intentions of the parties.   
The error that there is only one type of implied term, a term implied in fact, 
constantly resurfaces in cases during the following century.32 On at least two occasions, 
in Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd33 and Liverpool City Council v Irwin,34 
Lord Denning found himself in a minority in the Court of Appeal when applying a 
standard incident to a contract, with the majority sticking rigidly to the formula of 
business efficacy derived The Moorcock, though on both occasions the House of Lords 
eventually approved the use of terms implied by law. Indeed, in the latter case, after 
much hand-wringing, Lord Wilberforce relied upon a decision by no other than Bowen 
LJ, in which the latter had in effect created a standardised term for multi-occupancy 
dwellings under which the tenant enjoyed an implied easement over the common parts 
                                                 
31
 W.A. MacFarlane and G.W. Wrangham (eds), Chitty’s Treatise on the Law of Contracts (18th edn Sweet 
& Maxwell 1930) 121.   
32
 This view may be strongly influenced by Chitty on Contracts (above n. 12), which presents implied 
terms as a single category, all of which are implied by law (which is of course literally true), though 
acknowledging with respect to standardised terms (at para. 13-003, p. 986) ‘it is somewhat artificial to 
attribute such terms to the unexpressed intention of the parties.’  
33
 [1957] AC 555. 
34
 Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 (HL). 
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affording access to his home and the landlord was placed under a duty to maintain the 
staircase to keep it reasonably safe.35   As we will note below, it seems that we may be 
entering a new period of collective amnesia, when the possibility of terms implied in law 
is forgotten in the haste to amalgamate terms implied in fact with construction of the 
contract.  Each generation of judges has to rediscover that there are two types of implied 
terms, which logically consider separate questions. 
 
 
3. The Political and Structural Origins of Confusion. 
 
English judges are understandably wary about invitations to create either sort of implied 
term.  For the task of rule-making, not only is the court being invited to legislate, but also 
to do so perhaps without all the necessary information regarding this particular type of 
transaction, how it functions economically, and how the law regulates the contract in 
other ways that may not be immediately apparent in the course of a particular instance of 
litigation.  For the retrospective adjustment of the obligations of the parties, the courts are 
concerned that any hint of a power to rewrite contracts in order to ensure fair outcomes 
would precipitate an avalanche of claims from litigants who have discovered they are at 
the losing end of a bargain.  As Lord Bingham MR once pithily remarked: 
‘So the court comes to the task of implication with the benefit of hindsight, and it 
is tempting for the court then to fashion a term which will reflect the merits of the 
situation as they then appear.  Tempting, but wrong.’36 
To avoid the appearance of acting either as legislator or shining white knight, the courts 
spend a great deal of time either denying that they have such powers or insisting, in the 
alternative, if such powers do exist, that they are strictly confined by legal tests such as 
necessity or business efficacy that rule out any general power to rewrite contracts on the 
ground of fairness.   
These political and policy motivated denials of the powers involved in creating 
implied terms sow the seeds of confusion, but there are deeper roots for systematic 
misrepresentation.  To avoid the perils of appearing to ask a court to act either as 
legislator or saviour of the incautious, advocates can frame their submissions for implied 
terms in ways that misrepresent their character.  Four possible scenarios can be 
deconstructed, though in some instances similar arguments can be used to achieve rather 
different ends.   
 
A.  If a court is invited to create a standard incident for a type of contract, but is not 
inclined to do so, it can adopt the following lines of argument to reject the implied term. 
1. Deny or conveniently forget the possibility of a term implied by law as a 
standardised incident and insist that all terms must conform to the presumed intentions of 
the parties, as terms implied in fact, and that in this particular case those tacit intentions 
probably do not coincide.37   
2.  Define the category of contract for which the standard incident is proposed 
broadly, so that the standard incident may not seem appropriate for every type of case 
                                                 
35
 Miller v Hancock [1893] 2 QB 177, (CA) 180-181. 
36
 Phillips Electronique Grand Public SA v British Sky Broadcasting [1995] EMLR 472 (CA) 481. 
37
 Eg majority opinion in Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1976] QB 319 (CA).   
 9 
that might arise within that broad classification of the standard contract, so that the term 
can be rejected.38  
3. Deny that this is a recognisable standard type of contract, but is rather 
idiosyncratic and infrequent, so that the implication of any term in law would be 
inappropriate.39   
 
 
B.  If a court is invited to create a standard incident for a particular type of contract and 
is willing to do so, it can adopt the following lines of argument. 
1. Claim that the matter has already been decided by precedent. 
2. Describe the nature of the contract in narrow terms, so that the legislative 
character of the decision to create a standardised term is masked and its potential 
unforeseen ramifications are to some extent avoided.   
3. Describe the implied term as a term implied in fact for that particular contract, 
whilst of course creating the precedent that might be followed in the future. This is what 
happened in Yam Seng.40  Use of this strategy in the higher courts of appeal is particularly 
unfortunate, since it relieves the court of having to engage with the complexity of its 
legislative task, even though its decision is likely to be adopted as a precedent in future 
cases. 
 
C.  If a court is invited to create an adjustment of the terms of a particular contract and is 
unwilling to do so, it can adopt the following lines of argument.   
1. Claim that it is being invited to create a term implied in law for a broad class of 
contracts, for which it would be inappropriate to legislate.41  
2.  Insist that terms can only be implied if they satisfy a strict test of necessity.  
Once the contract has been construed according to the objective approach to 
interpretation and the perspective of the reasonable person, it is unlikely that this test of 
necessity could ever justify a further implication.  
 
D. If a court is invited to create an adjustment of the terms of a particular contract and is 
willing to do so, but does not want to appear as a shining white knight, it can adopt the 
following lines of argument. 
1. Claim that it is applying a term implied in law, often appealing to precedents to 
bolster the case, thereby avoiding the charge of acting as a saviour.42  To achieve that 
goal without disturbing the normal legal framework, the implied term may have to be 
applied to a tiny and rare class of contracts.43  
                                                 
38
 Peden points out that this was the strategy of the CA in Reid v. Rush & Tompkins Group Plc [1990] 1 
WLR 212 (CA): E Peden, ‘Policy Concerns Behind Implications in Law’ (2001) LQR 459, 461-462; if the 
class of employment contracts to which the duty had been applied had been confined to those involving 
foreign postings, the duty would have appeared much less burdensome and more appropriate. 
39
 Eg  Lord Denning MR, Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1976]1 WLR 1187 (CA),  1197D. 
40
 Above n 13 [131]. 
41
 Eg the majority opinion in Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555 (HL). 
42
 Eg the minority opinion in Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555 (HL). 
43
 Eg Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board [1992] 1 AC 294 (HL), where the judicial 
committee reached the conclusion that there is a sub-category of contracts of employment where the 
express terms confer a valuable right contingent on action being taken by the employee and the employee 
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2. Claim that it is merely interpreting the contract and not really inventing a term 
or making an adjustment at all.   
 
The point of setting out these various strategies of argument is to emphasise how 
much it may benefit the persuasiveness of an argument in favour or against an implied 
term by misclassifying the case between the two categories of implied term.  To persuade 
a judge to act as a shining white knight, for instance, it is usually advisable to disguise the 
measure by hiding behind precedents and to claim merely to be applying a well-
established implied term for this class of contracts.  After all, that is what Bowen LJ, the 
doyen of the subject, did in The Moorcock. 
 
 
 
4.  The Distinction between Interpretation and Implied Terms.  
 
Most recently, this confusion about the grounds for the implication of terms has been 
compounded by unguarded judicial claims that implied terms are merely an aspect of 
interpretation of the contract.  In Attorney-General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd,44  Lord 
Hoffmann gave the advice that: 
‘It follows that in every case in which it is said that some provision ought to be 
implied in an instrument, the question for the court is whether such a provision 
would spell out in express words what the instrument, read against the relevant 
background, would reasonably be understood to mean.’45 
From a more theoretical and linguistic point of view, Adam Kramer has argued that terms 
implied in fact are simply a special instance of interpretation of contracts.46  Can the 
implication of terms be reduced to the task of interpretation?   
The general point of the ‘interpretivists’, who occupy this position, is that where 
the words used in the contract are ambiguous, unclear, vague or incomplete, a court 
necessarily engages in an analysis of what the reasonable person would understand those 
words to mean, taking into account the context and the normal inferences to be drawn 
from the use of the language.  At one end of a spectrum of interpretation, the proper 
inference to be drawn from the express words used in contract in the context of the 
transaction will be obvious and uncontroversial; at the other end of the spectrum, it will 
be much less clear what inferences can and should be drawn because of the absence of 
directly pertinent language in the contract and the unforeseen character of the problem 
                                                                                                                                                 
cannot reasonably be aware of the existence of the right unless the employer draws it to his or her attention.  
This narrowing of the class of contracts to which the implied term applied avoided a more general duty of 
disclosure of information in contracts of employment. 
44
 [2009] UKPC 10, [2009] 2 All ER 1127 (PC). 
45
 See also: ‘As in the case of any implied term, the process is one of construction of the agreement as a 
whole in its commercial setting’, South Australia Asset Management Corporation v. York Montague Ltd. 
[1997] A.C. 191,  Lord Hoffmann,  212.  ‘The implication of terms is also part of the process of 
interpretation of written contracts’, Lord Steyn, ‘Legal Texts and their Landscape’, in B. Markesinis (ed.) 
The Coming Together of the Common Law and the Civil Law: The Clifford Chance Millenium Lectures 
(Oxford 2000) 84, and, more recently, J  Steyn, ‘The Intractable Problem of The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts’ (2003) 25 Sydney L Rev 5, 11. 
46
 Adam Kramer, ‘Implication in Fact as an Instance of Contractual Interpretation’ (2004) CLJ 384. 
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that has arisen.  Kramer’s suggestion is that, as the task of interpretation moves across 
this spectrum of difficulty, increasingly the courts use the terminology of implied terms. 
But, it is argued, there is no qualitative difference in the task being addressed.  The issue 
always is: what is the correct interpretation of the contract, taking into account its 
commercial purpose and the context in which it was made?   
It does little harm to acknowledge that implied terms can be used as a device for 
making the terms of a contract more specific or precise, though this tool hardly seems 
necessary today in view of the modern practice of construction according to the 
perspective of the reasonable person and frequent invocations of the mantra of ‘business 
common sense’47 to provide elaborate interpretations of written documents.   The 
question is, however, whether the language of implied terms is used typically or 
characteristically for this interpretive purpose.  My view is that either in the rule-making 
of terms implied in law or the adjustment of risks through terms implied in fact, a court is 
typically venturing beyond the terms expressed by the parties, even taking into account 
the possibility of expansive readings of the contract informed by context and commercial 
common sense.   
Sometimes the claim that the implied terms are used to venture beyond 
interpretation of ambiguity is explained by reference to the notion of a gap in the 
contract.48  Implied terms are presented, like mastic, as gap-fillers.  The problem with that 
view is that contracts function to allocate risks between the parties, so that any gap left by 
the contract implicitly allocates the risk onto the party who suffers the loss.  Hence the 
owner of The Moorcock had apparently accepted the risk of loss caused by an unsafe 
mooring by not insisting on an express warranty of a safe berth.  When successfully 
invoked, implied terms serve to reallocate risk away from the party who would otherwise 
bear the loss.  The reference to a gap in the contract avoids the appearance of rewriting 
the contractual allocation of risk.  It is true, admittedly, that sometimes it will be the case 
the parties have genuinely not foreseen the unlikely event that has occurred and have 
therefore made no express provision, so that there was a gap in the planning document.  
More often, though, it seems likely that standard risks, such as damage to the boat, have 
been discounted as improbable in the circumstances (the muddy riverbed of the Thames) 
and therefore not worth the cost of explicit consideration and express regulation in the 
terms of the contract.  The combination of transaction costs, misperceptions of risk, and 
attention bias in favour of the main aspects of the deal account for the omission of an 
express term to address the matter.  The problem with the metaphor of gap-filling is 
therefore that a more accurate description of the situation is often that the parties 
consciously made no provision in the contract, leaving the loss to lie where it fell.   It is 
not so much a gap as a conscious omission to address (what are perceived to be) 
improbable or remote risks. 
A sharper distinction between interpretation and implied terms therefore contrasts 
a lack of specificity or precision in the contract with an omission to protect against a 
                                                 
47
 Antaios Cia Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB, The Antios [1985] AC 191, 201: ‘business common 
sense’ Lord Diplock; Lord Napier and Ettrick v R F Kershaw Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 756, 763: ‘commercially 
sensible construction’ Lord Steyn; Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900, 
‘business common sense’, Lord Clarke [30]. 
48
 Implied terms are described as supplementing defective actual intention by filling lacunae in Salmond 
Winfield, above n2, 51, giving as examples The Moorcock and Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 (CA). 
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particular risk.  Where a contract is vague on a particular point, it can usually be 
completed through an interpretation of the words that were used.  Where one party has 
omitted to protect itself against a particular risk that has arisen, the issue moves beyond 
interpretation to a consideration whether, notwithstanding the omission, it would be 
appropriate for the court to create a term that affords protection against the risk.  This 
contrast between interpretation and implied terms becomes especially evident in cases 
where one party is exercising unfettered rights or discretionary powers conferred 
explicitly by the contract in a self-interested way.  There is no gap in the contract, but 
there is an omission to protect against misuse of the right or the exercise of discretion for 
an improper purpose.49  A court may decide to remedy this omission by inserting an 
implied term that effectively fetters an unqualified right or discretionary power conferred 
explicitly by the contract.  Only in a very loose sense can this adjustment of risks be 
described as an interpretation of the contract. The implied term remedies an omission by 
one party to protect itself against a risk that otherwise it would have to carry. The famous 
officious bystander test, first formulated by Scrutton LJ,50 then developed by Mackinnon 
LJ, initially at a lecture at the London School of Economics and subsequently in the 
Court of Appeal,51 focuses correctly on this idea of addressing omissions in the express 
allocations of risk.   Unfortunately, the officious bystander is never there when you need 
her.   
If this sharp distinction between interpretation and reallocation of risk can be 
drawn, why does Lord Hoffman insist upon assimilation?  His advice in Attorney-
General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd should be placed in context.  His quarrel in this 
case was with the way in which an earlier decision by Lord Simon of Glaisdale, giving 
the advice of the majority of the Privy Council in BP Refinery (Westenport) Pty Ltd v 
Shire of Hastings,52 had been taken up in Australian law.  There the law developed the 
dubious proposition that implied terms have to satisfy the business efficacy test and the 
officious bystander test, as well as a reasonableness test, plus some others.53  Lord 
Hoffmann protests that all these tests are designed to spell out the meaning of the 
contract, as understood by a reasonable man, and should not be regarded as independent 
tests.  He is surely correct that the tests were intended to function as alternatives, not 
cumulative requirements, and that in so far as the request to imply a term is based upon 
                                                 
49
 Eg Equitable Life Assurance Co. Ltd v Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408 (HL); Abu Dhabi 
National Tanker Co v Product Star Shipping Ltd (The “Product Star”) (No 2) [1993] 1 Lloyd's LR 397 
(CA); Horkulak v Cantor Fitzgerald International [2004] EWCA Civ 1287, [2005] ICR 402 (CA); Socimer 
International Bank Ltd v Standard Bank London Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 116, [2008] 1 Lloyd’s LR 558. Cp: 
Patterson v Meyerhofer 97 N.E.2d 472 (N.Y. 1912); Fortune v National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E. 2d 
1251 (Mass. 1977). Cf  H Collins, ‘Discretionary Powers in Contracts’ in D Campbell, H Collins and J 
Wightman (eds), Implicit Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, Relational, and Network Contracts (Hart 
Publishing  2003) 219. 
50
 Reigate v. Union Manufacturing Co. (Ramsbottom) 1918] 1 K.B. 592 at 605 “A term can only be implied 
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 Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206 (CA) 227; A. Phang, ‘Implied terms, business 
efficacy and the officious bystander – a modern history’ (1998) JBL 1. 
52
 (1977) 180 CLR 266, 282-283. 
53
 J  Paterson, A  Robertson, A  Duke, Principles of Contract Law (4th edn Lawbook Co. 2012) 330-337. 
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the presumed intentions of the parties with respect to vague or imprecise terms, the 
principal question remains the proper interpretation of the contract, the answer to which 
may to some extent be aided by the various tests.  Whilst concurring with that general 
point of criticism of the multi-test approach, my argument is that implied terms serve also 
what Lord Bingham described as ‘a different and altogether more ambitious 
undertaking’54 concerning (in my view) the reallocation of risk.  This more ambitious 
undertaking requires a more circumspect approach than a simple reference what a 
reasonable man would think the parties had agreed.  Recognising this distinction between 
interpretation and implied terms, though not in the framework advanced here, the Court 
of Appeal has stressed recently that the touchstone for the implication remains necessity 
rather than reasonableness.55  Whilst I shall maintain that necessity is the incorrect test 
and that a single test for the two types of implied terms is plainly wrong, the Court of 
Appeal is surely right to reject the imperialism of the interpretivists.   
 
 
5. Good Faith and Fair Dealing as the Source of Implied Terms. 
 
Having clarified these various points, it is convenient to address my central claim that the 
notion of good faith and fair dealing plays a crucial role in the implication of terms.  But 
the notion of good faith differs between terms implied in fact and terms implied in law, 
so these categories have to be considered separately.  The contrasting notions of good 
faith need to be set out before looking in detail at their application to the implication of 
terms. 
 
The Spectrum of Good Faith 
 
The standard of good faith and fair dealing should be understood as comprising a 
spectrum of norms.  At its narrowest end, good faith merely requires honesty in fact.  
This minimum requirement probably applies to all contracts, even in the most 
antagonistic trading.56  At the other end of the spectrum of good faith, it edges close to 
fiduciary duties by requiring performance of the contract that takes the interests of the 
other party into account.   
                                                 
54
 Philips Electronique Grand Publique SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [1995] EMLR 472, (CA) 481. 
55
 Mediterranean Salvage & Towage Limited v Seamar Trading & Commerce Inc, The Reborn [2009] 
EWCA Civ 531, [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 639; Lomas & Ors v JFB Firth Rixson Inc & Ors[2012] EWCA Civ 
419; see also: Baroness Hale JSC in Geys v Société Générale, London Branch [2012] UKSC 63, [2013] 
ICR 117,  [55]. 
56
 HIH Casualty v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61 (HL): ‘Parties entering into a 
commercial contract … will assume the honesty and good faith of the other; absent such an assumption 
they would not deal’ Lord Bingham [15].  Lord Kenyon, Mellish v. Motteux (1792) Peake 156 at 157 (170 
E.R. 113 at pp. 113-114), ‘In contracts of all kinds, it is of the highest importance that courts of law should 
compel the observance of honesty and good faith’. It is arguable that this is what Lord Mansfield meant 
when he suggested that good faith was a governing principle applicable to all contracts in Carter v. Boehm 
(1766) 3 Burr. 1905, 1909 (97 E.R. 1162, 1164).  In the US, this end of the spectrum is described as the 
‘intentional torts’ such as fraud: T D  Rakoff, ‘Good Faith in Contract Performance: Market Street 
Associates Ltd Partnership v Frey’ (2007) 120 Harv Law Rev. 1187, 1190. 
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Paul Finn has helpfully distinguished a point along this spectrum of good faith 
(near the minimum honesty requirement) that imposes a standard of unconscionability.57  
Although this sense of unconscionability does not require proof of dishonesty in the 
subjective sense of knowingly misleading the other party to the contract, it may be 
satisfied by opportunistic actions that take unfair advantage of the other party’s 
weaknesses (as in the law of undue influence) or of omissions in the express allocations 
of risk in the contract (as in terms implied in fact).  Unconscionability in this sense 
consists in taking advantage of an omission to protect against risk in circumstances where 
this advantage had not been bargained for as part of the consideration.     
This narrow meaning of good faith, labelled here as unconscionability, should be 
contrasted with a broader sense towards the centre of the spectrum of good faith that is 
concerned with establishing efficient and balanced obligations under contracts.  It is here 
that the standard famously proposed by Lord Steyn of the ‘reasonable expectations of 
honest men’ can be invoked to shape a contract.58  The reasonable expectation standard 
requires the court to interpret the contract so that it makes commercial sense for both 
parties, to place duties of care on the parties during the course of negotiations to provide 
reliable information, and to supplement contracts with standard incidents that are 
conducive to the efficiency of the contract and serve to maintain a fair balance of 
interests between the parties.  Reasonable expectations are grounded both in the express 
terms of the contract and the business context in which it is made.59  Good faith and fair 
dealing requires both parties to a contract to respect those reasonable expectations of the 
other (provided, of course, they are not excluded by express terms of the contract).  A 
party may still look primarily to his or her own interests, but in the performance of the 
contract and in the exercise of rights and powers conferred by the contract, that party 
must not defeat or undermine the reasonable expectations of the other.  It implies a duty 
on each party to do what, within his reasonable powers, is necessary to permit the other 
party to enjoy the benefit of the contract.60  
 
Terms Implied in Fact 
 
The tests commonly invoked for terms implied in fact, such as ‘business efficacy’ or 
‘business necessity’, are unsatisfactory.  Both of these tests necessarily assume an 
understanding of the purpose of the contract, for it is only against this purpose that 
business efficacy or necessity can be judged.  The problem with the idea of the purpose 
of the contract is that it is a metaphysical construct that seeks to create a unity of purpose 
in a situation where the parties may well have to a considerable extent conflicting 
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purposes.  Furthermore, given the broader approach to interpretation used in the courts 
today, it seems unlikely that such tests could ever justify the addition of a term: once the 
terms of the contract have been elucidated according to the standard of commercial 
common sense, what else could be truly necessary?  Nor do these tests properly 
acknowledge the incompleteness of the contract in the sense that one party has failed to 
protect itself a foreseeable risk.  The ‘officious bystander’ test has the virtue that it 
acknowledges the presence of an omission in the allocation of risk, but its appeal to the 
tacit agreement of the parties fails to address adequately the crucial question whether it 
would be unjust to leave the loss to lie where it falls or whether the omission should be 
rectified. . 
In general, without a doubt, the courts should not engage in such a reallocation of 
risk, but let the loss lie where it falls.  But there are a few instances where it is 
appropriate for a court to intervene.  In these cases, one party is seeking to take an 
advantage that has not been paid for as part of the consideration of the contract.  The 
contract may omit to regulate this particular advantage or it may apparently permit this 
advantage to be taken by one party owing to the broad terms in which the contract is 
written.  A court should then ask whether permitting this advantage to be taken in 
accordance with the express terms of the contract would be a breach of standards of good 
faith and fair dealing in the narrow sense of ‘unconscionability’.    If so, an implied term 
to fill the omission or qualify the power will be appropriate.  Let me illustrate this 
analysis by reference to Equitable Life Assurance Co. Ltd v Hyman.61 
In Equitable Life Assurance Co. Ltd v Hyman, the House of Lords was invited to 
imply a term in fact into a with-profits pension assurance scheme.  Under such schemes, 
the assured invests in a fund through regular savings, which, when the appropriate profits 
of the investment fund are added as a discretionary final bonus, creates a capital sum that 
can then be used to purchase an annuity for life at the then prevailing rates of interest.  In 
this case, however, Equitable Life had guaranteed 90,000 of its investors a minimum 
percentage rate of interest for the annuity without additional charge.  When other annuity 
interest rates fell below this guaranteed amount, the company began to find itself in 
financial difficulty.  To solve the problem, it relied upon its discretionary power to 
determine the final bonus in order to reduce the amount of the guaranteed investors’ 
capital fund, thereby reducing the effective annuity to the standard market rate of interest.  
In other words, under the contractual scheme the company had two levers by which to 
prevent excessive pay-outs: it could lower interest rates or set the final bonus at a lower 
level.   Having foregone the opportunity to lower interest rates, it used the other lever to 
reduce its liability.  The question before the House of Lords was whether an implied term 
in the contract would prevent the company from discriminating against the group of 
customers with the guaranteed minimum rate of interest by awarding them a lower final 
bonus.  The company insisted that the express terms of the contract with the investors 
awarded it complete discretion with respect to the declaration of a final bonus and that its 
conduct in effect gave all savers the same rate of return and would save the company 
from financial difficulty.  The House of Lords upheld the existence of the implied term.   
Although Professor Neil Andrews describes the implied term as disastrous in 
view of the subsequent collapse of Equitable Life,62 this is precisely the sort of case 
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where an implied term should be considered.  The House of Lords held that the term was 
necessary for business efficacy, which seems unconvincing: the contract could function 
perfectly well as a tax efficient investment vehicle and pensions device without the 
implied term.  The problem was rather that, without the implied term, the promised 
guaranteed minimum rate of return for the annuity was illusory.  It was a case of financial 
misselling and the court could use the implied term to punish Equitable Life for 
misleading 90,000 investors.  Is that a good enough reason to introduce the implied term 
into the contract?  It certainly could be described as an instance of a breach of an implied 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing (though the House of Lords made no mention of 
that standard).  But in my view, breach of that standard is insufficient in itself.  It is also 
necessary to reach the conclusion, under the standard of unconscionability described 
above, that the company was taking an advantage under the contract for which it had not 
bargained.  The question is whether, by tempting investors with the promise of a 
guaranteed minimum rate of return, the company had implicitly accepted a limitation on 
how it would exercise its normally unfettered discretion in the declaration of final 
bonuses.  Was the company trying to recapture a foregone opportunity? 63 This is the hard 
issue in the case.  On the one hand, the promise of a guaranteed rate of interest suggests 
that the company had agreed implicitly to exercise its discretion over the final bonus in 
the normal way, but on the other hand it was also true that the express terms of the 
contract reserved the normal discretion over the declaration of the bonus and the 
customers had not paid an additional fee for this advantage in comparison with other 
investors.  On my analysis, the absence of an additional payment probably tips the 
balance against finding an implied term in favour of the investors, though the House of 
Lords preferred the competing view that the company was trying to take an advantage 
under the contract that it had by implication already sacrificed. 
In a second ground for the decision in favour of the investors, the House of Lords 
approved unanimously the application of an implied term that the company’s discretion 
in awarding the final bonus should not be exercised capriciously, arbitrarily, or 
irrationally.  In applying this implied term, Lord Cooke argued that the discretion over 
the declaration of a final bonus had been used for an improper purpose: to equalise the 
share of all investors in the capital fund rather than to uphold the guaranteed benefit to 
some.  This implied term, though probably better classified as a term implied in law to 
govern discretionary powers conferred by contracts,64 seems to be a good faith standard 
under a different name.   The purpose for which the discretion was exercised is surely 
only improper if it seeks to recapture an advantage that had been explicitly or implicitly 
foregone in the original agreement. In contrast, if the company exercised its discretion or 
rights under the contract to benefit its own financial position within the terms permitted 
by the contract, or, as a mutual fund to advance its mandate to protect all investors,65 it 
would be odd to label this behaviour as irrational.  
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It helps to clarify this meaning of good faith and fair dealing as unconscionability 
to contrast the litigation in Equitable Life with that in Concord Trust v Law Debenture 
Trust Corp.66  The issuer of bonds was concerned that the Trustee for the bondholders 
was about to give notice of an ‘event of default’, when in the view of the issuer no such 
event had occurred.  The consequence of the Trustee giving notice would have been to 
accelerate all the payment obligations, force further defaults, and probably to cause 
considerable economic loss to the issuer.  Although the trust deed required the Trustee to 
give the notice of default if instructed to do so by the bondholders, the Trustee was 
reluctant to do so without an indemnity from the bondholders against the potential 
liability for substantial consequential loss to the issuer.  The question before the House of 
Lords was: if the Trustee issued a notice of default that turned out to be invalid in the 
circumstances, would it be liable to the issuer for damages?  The Judicial Committee 
rejected any grounds of liability including a suggested implied term that the Trustee 
would not give an invalid notice of default.  The implied term was dismissed 
peremptorily on the ground that it did not satisfy the Moorcock test of business efficacy.  
The implied term was treated as one of fact, though it was appreciated that its existence 
would be of considerable significance for all Eurobonds and syndicated loan agreements.  
Accordingly, the issuer would have to take its chances that the Trustee would not make 
mistakes.  The result was surely correct, but the answer should have been more 
circumspect and nuanced.  The question that would be posed under my proposed good 
faith standard of unconscionability would be whether the contract should limit the power 
of the Trustee to give notice of default on the ground that the trustee might take an 
unbargained-for advantage in giving notice.  It seems unlikely that any trustee would act 
in such a way, but it seems to me that it would be appropriate to add a safeguard against 
any trustee acting dishonestly, for an improper purpose, or arbitrarily, capriciously, 
carelessly, or in a way that no reasonable trustee would act.  Such an implied term would 
not have helped the borrower in this case as the trustee had acted with utmost 
circumspection, but it would have established potential grounds for liability towards 
issuers in the future instead of the crude rejection of any risk of liability for the Trustee.   
Terms implied in fact are likely to be rare.  They are designed to address a 
particular type of incompleteness in contracts, where one party has omitted to protect 
itself against a risk.  The implied term should not be inserted on the ground that it is said 
to be necessary, because a contract, when properly interpreted, should normally function 
adequately without it.  The implied term is needed rather to address a different problem: 
one party is relying on the express terms and the other’s omission to qualify them with 
respect to a particular risk to take an advantage that has not been bargained for or paid 
for, thereby taking unfair advantage of the other’s error.  In general, English law will not 
rescue parties to contracts from mistaken omissions, but where the standard of 
unconscionability has been breached, this deliberate opportunism can be parried by the 
sword of an implied term.   
 
 
Terms Implied by Law 
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For the standard incidents of contracts that apply as default rules, the terms implied by 
law, a court is prescribing the ground rules for typical transactions.  In doing so, a court 
should normally conform to previous decisions in analogous contracts.  In the absence of 
such governing precedents, many judges have recognised that this legislative activity 
requires consideration of a broad range of factors.  For example, Dyson LJ said with 
respect to standardised terms:  
‘It seems to me that, rather than focus on the elusive concept of necessity, it is 
better to recognise that, to some extent at least, the existence and scope of 
standardised implied terms raise questions of reasonableness, fairness and the 
balancing of competing policy considerations.’67   
Elizabeth Peden has helpfully trawled through the cases to identify the kinds of policy 
considerations that have been mentioned by the courts.68  In my view, however, an open-
ended examination of policy considerations is neither appropriate nor necessary for the 
formulation of terms implied in law.  In my view, the task can be narrowed satisfactorily 
to a two-stage enquiry.  
A court should first of all try to discover a default rule that achieves an efficient 
allocation of risks as between the parties.  One reason for emphasising efficiency is that 
such a default rule is likely to prove to be the rule that the parties would have agreed if 
they had negotiated the issue.   
‘If the condition is such that every reasonable man on the one part would desire 
for his own protection to stipulate for the condition, and that no reasonable man 
on the other part would refuse to accede to it, then it is not unnatural that the 
condition should be taken for granted in all contracts of the class without the 
necessity of giving it formal expression.’69 
As a consequence, the rule should reduce transaction costs.  But even if it seems 
improbable that the parties would have actually agreed the term, the efficient rule should 
be selected as the default rule so that parties who wish to insist upon inefficient and 
unreasonable arrangements should be forced to do so explicitly.  The House of Lords in 
Liverpool City Council v Irwin70 rightly chose the efficient rule that imposed a duty on 
the Council to maintain the common parts of the tower block, notwithstanding the strong 
suspicion that the Council had deliberately intended to avoid any responsibility for the 
appalling conditions of the common parts of the tower block.  But efficiency should not 
be the only criterion.   
Despite its commercial good sense in general, an efficiency criterion may be 
indeterminate and it may unbalance the obligations in the transaction or create risks of 
opportunism.   An efficient rule may have to be balanced or modified by a further implied 
term that restricts its application or controls the discretion that it confers for the purpose 
of creating a fair balance of obligations.  The second stage of the enquiry should return to 
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another version of the standard of good faith and fair dealing.  The rule should conform 
to the reasonable expectations of the parties in entering the contract by avoiding the 
potential risk of granting one or the other an unexpected advantage.  These reasonable 
expectations are likely to be informed by normal commercial practices, customs, usages, 
and an understanding of an appropriate commercial balance of obligations.   
Consider, for instance, the implied term of mutual trust and confidence that was 
declared by the House of Lords to be a term implied in law in contracts of employment.71  
The courts had already held that the contract of employment contains implied terms 
requiring employees to comply with lawful instructions of employers and to serve the 
employer faithfully within the requirements of the contract.72  These implied terms serve 
to uphold the efficient operation of contracts of employment, which are necessarily 
incomplete in their design of the performance obligations.73  To prevent misuse of these 
contractual powers to manage the workforce, the courts developed the implied term that 
an employer should not ‘without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner 
calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and 
trust between employer and employee.’  Lord Nicholls has described the implied term in 
the language of good faith: ‘In his conduct of his business, and in his treatment of 
employees, an employer must act responsibly and in good faith’.74  It is possible to justify 
this implied term on the ground of efficiency: conduct of the kind prohibited by the 
implied term is likely to diminish the motivation, commitment, and performance of 
employees and lead them to quit the job, causing the employer considerable costs arising 
from labour turnover.75  Modern human resources management rejects the autocratic 
regimes practiced under ‘scientific management’;76 it seeks instead through fair 
management to build ‘organisational citizenship behaviour’, performance ‘beyond 
contract’, and commitment to the goals of the business, in order to maximise productivity 
through co-operation or ‘partnership’.77  In addition, however, as Lord Steyn pointed out, 
the implied term could be justified as matching the expectations of the parties under 
modern employer-employee relationships, in which employers are expected to assume 
obligations to care for the physical, financial and psychological welfare of employees.78  
Lord Steyn further presented the implied term as a tool for striking the balance between 
an ‘employer’s interest in managing his business as he sees fit and the employee’s 
interest in not being unfairly and improperly exploited’.79  The implied term of mutual 
trust and confidence was therefore justified both by reference to an efficiency criterion 
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and a fair balance of obligations that conform to the reasonable expectations of the 
parties.   
The importance of standard incidents in setting a fair balance of obligations 
emerges even more clearly in the application of judicial controls over unfair terms in 
contracts.  In most civil law systems, where an exclusion clause removes or detracts from 
a standard incident that is applied by the civil code to a particular contract type, a court 
will treat the term as presumptively unfair and unenforceable.   Further examination of 
the contract may reveal some compensating benefit in return for the exclusion, in which 
case the term will be enforceable.80   Although English law has not explicitly embraced 
this conception of unfair terms in contracts, it is implicit, for instance, in the reluctance to 
permit exclusion of negligence liability that normally arises from a default rule,81 and it is 
a helpful tool in tackling the meaning of the ideas of ‘good faith’ and ‘substantial 
imbalance’ in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.82 
English lawyers may be alarmed by this invocation of the notion of fairness in the 
criteria for adopting implied terms in law.  This fear is misplaced.  Courts are not being 
authorised to act as shining white knights to relieve parties from bad bargains.  For terms 
implied in law, they are being asked to create standard incidents for particular types of 
contracts that should normally ensure a fair balance of burdens and advantages between 
the parties.  Moreover, the parties are always free to vary the incidents of their particular 
contract.  In the case of the common law’s implied term of merchantable quality for sales 
of goods, for instance, the argument employed originally in favour of this default rule 
was to achieve a fair balance of advantages, for if someone paid the market price for a 
commodity he would have a reasonable expectation of receiving goods in a sound 
condition.  If he did not receive such goods, without any excepting conditions, the 
contract was ‘simply an unfair exchange’.83  The test for terms implied by law is not 
appropriately described as one of necessity, for the task of fashioning default rules is not 
confined to radical omissions that remove business efficacy from the contract.  The 
standard incidents should be fashioned rather to secure a fair balance of obligations, 
which may be achieved by asking both what would be an efficient allocation of risk for 
this type of contract and what would conform to the reasonable expectations of honest 
men and women. 
 
 
6. Relational Contracts and Networks 
 
Despite the frequent references to good faith, the above interpretation of the English law 
of implied terms in contracts provides scant support for the striking suggestion of Leggatt 
J, in Yam Seng v International Trade Corporation, that there is an independent and 
general implied term of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of contracts.  But 
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what light does this interpretation throw on his more guarded proposal to find enhanced 
obligations of good faith in ‘relational contracts’?84   
I agree with Leggatt J’s general observation that the English common law 
approaches duties of good faith, loyalty, and co-operation arising in contractual 
arrangements according to an unsatisfactory binary divide.  On the one side there are 
fiduciary duties or their equivalent that require utmost good faith, the avoidance of even 
the appearance of a conflict of interest, and the placing of the other party’s interests ahead 
of one’s own. On the other side of the divide, short of fraud or other illegitimate 
practices, every party to a contract is entitled to look solely to their own interests subject 
to the constraint of actual subjective dishonesty and general obligations arising under the 
law of tort.   Given the complexity of commercial relationships, however, this binary 
divide is inevitably too crude to capture full range of the reasonable expectations of 
honest participants in contractual arrangements.  The problem for the common law is to 
construct a richer apparatus of classification, so that limited duties of good faith, loyalty, 
and co-operation can be applied in one or more intermediate categories.  Earlier I 
suggested that we are looking at a spectrum of good faith obligations, not a single 
intermediate category, but the question remains how to identify a class of contracts that 
require more intense obligations of co-operation and loyalty, which nevertheless fall short 
of fiduciary obligations.  What is the crucial variable that alters as contracts move across 
the spectrum from norms of self-interested antagonistic interests to obligations of good 
faith, disclosure, and co-operation? 
Following an original suggestion by Ian Macneil,85 law and economics 
scholarship appropriated the idea of relational contracts to explore problems arising in 
long-term contracts.86  Certainly, many long-term contracts seem to require 
supplementary duties for their business efficacy.  Given the impossibility of knowing 
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what the future holds, such long-term contracts are likely to be incomplete in their 
allocation of risks.  Although parties to long-term contracts foresee that they may well 
need to adapt their arrangements to respond to future contingencies, their forward 
planning achieved by the use of vague terms or agreed governance procedures for making 
such adjustments may prove inadequate to prevent opportunism.  Flexible terms that 
permit adjustments such as price variations may prove too coarse to respond 
appropriately to unexpected events, giving one party an unbargained-for advantage.  
Similarly, granting one party a discretionary power to vary the terms of the contract 
unilaterally will perhaps keep it afloat even in choppy seas, but at the price of the serious 
risk of opportunism and exploitation.  These risks of opportunism may be intensified in 
long-term contracts owing to the heavy investment of one or both parties in the 
commercial project.87  Given these features of long-term contracts, it seems inevitable 
that they will occasionally require judicial surgery through construction and the 
implication of terms in fact. 
Whilst those points are surely correct, they do not lend support to the further 
claim that there should be enhanced duties of good faith, loyalty and co-operation in all 
long-term contracts as a standard incident implied by law.  The context of the transaction 
may reveal that the long-term contract was intended to be rigid and binding, no matter 
what the change of circumstances, as a hedge against risk, so that in the absence of 
express allocations of risk, a fair interpretation of the contract would be to let the risks lie 
where they fall.   In syndicated loan agreements, for instance, though they may be 
expected to last for many years, no-one involved is expecting to adjust their terms or to 
help the other party out of financial difficulty; rigidity of obligations is their commercial 
attraction.  Enhanced duties of loyalty and co-operation may be required more frequently 
in long-term contracts than spot contracts, but the expected duration of the contract is not 
a reliable or helpful guide to a need for the law, adopting a contextual approach, to 
specify such enhanced obligations.88  
In my view, it is not the duration of contracts that provides the key variable in the 
spectrum of good faith obligations, but rather the incentive structure of the contract, 
which itself is determined by how the contract fits into relations of production.  In 
economic theory, a crude but insightful distinction is drawn between markets and 
organisations (or firms).89  In markets, contracts for goods and services are made between 
parties with antagonistic interests in the transaction.  There is predominantly a zero sum 
game in which the purchaser and seller seek to maximise their advantage at the cost of 
the other party to the transaction.  Within organisations, however, though there is a 
network of contracts that bind the parties together, such as contracts of employment, 
share ownership, and directorships, the zero-sum game is replaced by a mechanism that 
requires co-operation from everyone to maximise the profits of the organisation itself, the 
profits then being distributed according to the formula set by the contracts.  The law 
reflects the economic logic of the organisation by imposing duties of loyalty on all the 
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members of the organisation: the directors of a company owe fiduciary duties, employees 
and managers duties of loyalty and good faith.  The crucial variable that determines the 
incidence of obligations of loyalty and co-operation is the point at which the contract falls 
on the spectrum between market and organisation.  International commodity sales are 
right at the market end of the spectrum; partnerships lie at the other organisational end.   
Contracts that lie well towards the organisational end of the spectrum may be 
described as contracts that constitute an arrangement for quasi-integration of production, 
hybrids, or, more snappily, networks.90  By quasi-integration is meant the idea that 
though no single legal entity binds the parties together but rather the arrangement is 
formed by two or more separate organisations that retain their antagonistic interests, the 
agreement seeks to achieve many features of organisations for the purpose of establishing 
efficient relations of production.  In business format franchise agreements, for instance, 
the franchisor and franchisee remain separate business entities, but they co-operate for 
the purpose of marketing a product or service.  Both parties have an interest in 
maximising retail sales, for which purpose they will need to co-operate intensively, yet 
both parties have an interest in maximising their own returns on their investment by 
securing a greater share of the profits in the franchise agreement.   As an illustration, 
consider the problem that arose in Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd.91 Shell, the 
franchisor of tied petrol stations, discriminated between neighbouring franchisees in the 
level of rebates, with the effect that the claimant had to run the business at a loss for a 
period of months.  Although the contract was silent on the topic of rebates, thereby 
apparently leaving Shell complete discretion, its conduct was calculated to destroy the 
claimant’s franchise contract and undermine the whole business operation by favouring 
some franchisees. Shell also granted substantial rebates to its own in-house petrol 
stations, thereby competing with its own small franchisees in a manner calculated to drive 
them out of business.  The underlying economic logic in these quasi-integration 
arrangements is driven both by the market and the organisation: parties must both 
compete and co-operate.92  Shell in this instance acted solely within a market frame of 
reference: it only granted the concessionary rebates to franchisees with sufficient 
bargaining power to demand them.  Though in a minority in the Court of Appeal, Bridge 
LJ was surely correct to find an implied term that placed constraints on the franchisor’s 
power to discriminate between franchisees,93 which in effect imposed a duty of loyalty 
towards the franchise network.94   
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In Yam Seng v International Trade Corporation, Leggatt J correctly identified 
franchises, joint ventures, and distributorships as examples of contracts where greater 
duties of co-operation and good faith arise.  Commercial agents should be added to the 
list.95  The reason why these contracts require as normal incidents greater duties of 
loyalty and co-operation is not because they are long-term and not because the parties 
may have invested substantially in the project, though both of these features are likely to 
be present, but because the contract establishes a quasi-integrated system of relations of 
production with intensified contradictory pressures simultaneously both to co-operate and 
to compete. The economic logic of networks is that both parties will be better off if they 
co-operate to maximise the size of the pie, such as sales in a franchise or distribution 
network, but simultaneously they need to compete to obtain a greater slice of the profits 
arising from their labours.  Each party needs to be co-operative and loyal to the general 
aim of the networked business enterprise, whilst ensuring that it obtains the maximum 
share of the rewards. These obligations of loyalty and co-operation within networks must 
fall short of those applicable to organisations, however, for both parties remain residual 
profit-takers with antagonistic interests.  Loyalty is owed, not to each other, but rather to 
the network as an independent business operation.96 
These implicit obligations may be divided into three aspects.  First, there is the 
duty to assist the other in its performance of the contract for the sake of maximising the 
benefits to both parties that will accrue from a successful business network.  Under this 
heading, the sharing of information is often crucial, but disclosure is confined to 
information which is necessary for the profitability of the network, but does not extend to 
information that might damage a party’s interest in a greater residual share of the profit.  
Second, there is a duty to avoid harming the interests of the other party unless there is a 
compensating interest in profit or benefit to oneself.  The third element of the intensified 
duties of loyalty is to defend the quasi-integrated system of production and the joint 
interests of the parties against adverse interference by third parties.   
In the Yam Seng case, the defendant had committed a breach of all three aspects 
of the duties of loyalty and co-operation.  The contract was for the distribution of the 
defendant’s bottles of fragrances and other toiletries through duty free shops and 
elsewhere in the Far East.  The brand of the fragrances was Manchester United and the 
packaging used the insignia of the soccer team.  Given the worldwide popularity of the 
brand name, presumably it was expected that consumers would purchase the products as 
a way of identifying with their heroes.  The contract was brief and relatively informal.  
As well as complaining about misrepresentations made prior to entry into the contract, 
the claimant argued that there had been a breach of contract by the defendant when it 
permitted sales of the product in high streets in the Far East at prices below those 
specified for sales in the duty free airport outlets where the claimant was marketing the 
products.  The court found that although the defendant had not deliberately permitted this 
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under-cutting of prices in the duty free shops, it had failed to cooperate either by stopping 
the undercutting or by alerting the claimant to his inability to prevent it.  Leggatt J 
decided in favour of the claimant on this point on the narrow ground of actual dishonesty 
rather than a broader duty of co-operation,97 therefore not relying at all on his ambitious 
claims about good faith and relational contracts.   This was regrettable: on my analysis, 
the conduct involved a failure to disclose information that was vital to the success of the 
business operation, harming the interests of the claimant without any compensating 
advantage to the defendant since he did not benefit from the higher retail sales price in 
the high street, and defendant’s conduct failed to defend this distributorship against its 
competitors.  In short, there had been a clear breach of a term that should have been 
implied by law requiring loyalty and co-operation within this quasi-integrated system of 
production. 
This analysis confirms the main proposition in the Yam Seng case that there is a 
class of contracts where intensified duties of loyalty and co-operation arise.  These 
contracts demand obligations of good faith in performance, expressed through default 
rules, which lie closer to the end of the spectrum of good faith near fiduciary duties.  
Unlike fiduciary duties, they do not require sacrifices to the interests of the other party to 
the contract, but they do require loyalty to the aims of the joint project.  The rationale for 
imposing such intensified duties of loyalty in such cases is that the contractual 
arrangements constitute an organisational framework for production that should function 
in a similar (though not identical) way to a single firm by binding each member to duties 
of performance in good faith. 
 
 
7. Good Faith in Performance of Contracts 
 
American and Australian readers of this investigation of implied terms in English 
contract law will be struck by the similarity between my interpretation of the use of 
implied terms in England and the meaning placed in those other common law 
jurisdictions on the notion of the duty to perform the contract in good faith.  What is done 
under the rubric of good faith in performance in the United States,98 or an implied term of 
good faith in performance in Australia,99 can be matched in England by the device of 
implied terms without explicitly mentioning the concept of good faith itself.   
My analysis of implied terms suggests that English law has, to its advantage, 
developed a nuanced conception of good faith in performance by using its chosen 
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mechanism of implied terms.  Some of the heavy lifting can be done by interpretation of 
the contract in context, bearing in mind ‘commercial common sense’.  In addition, with 
great reluctance, English law is prepared to intervene to rewrite allocations of risk, but 
only where an omission to transfer a risk has been taken advantage of in an 
unconscionable manner.  Otherwise, a claimant will have to persuade a court that the 
omission to transfer a risk is covered by a standard incident for that type of contract, 
which corresponds to the reasonable expectations of honest participants in the market.   
Although these two types of arguments for implied terms are logically distinct and 
employ different conceptions of good faith and fair dealing, we have noted how the 
techniques are often elided or used inappropriately for instrumental reasons.   
If all implied terms, except those that merely contribute to the interpretation of the 
original contract, are founded on a principle of good faith and fair dealing, there is no 
reason for English law to follow Leggatt J, PECL, and Australia in creating a separate 
and independent implied term of good faith and fair dealing.  Nevertheless, it would be 
useful to recognise a class of contracts where there exists a type of ‘good faith regime’.100 
Within the spectrum of transactions ranging from market to organisation, implied duties 
of loyalty and co-operation should intensify as a contractual arrangement approaches the 
organisational end of the spectrum in a quasi-integrated system of production or network.   
In my view, therefore, the polarised positions developed in the English scholarly 
literature for and against a duty to perform a contract in good faith are beside the point.  
As so often was the case, Lord Bingham hit the nail on the head when he observed that 
‘In many civil law systems…the law of obligations recognises an overriding principle 
that in making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith …English law 
has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle but has developed 
piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness.’101  In short, the 
bull has been loose in the china shop for more than a century under the disguise of the 
‘piecemeal solution’ of implied terms. 
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